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)
)
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)
)
v.
)
)
DANNY JOE KRUEGER,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
______________________________)

NO. 48175-2020
ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-19-29497

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Danny Krueger appeals from the judgment of conviction for aggravated assault and use
of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony. After Mr. Krueger pleaded guilty to
aggravated assault and use of a deadly weapon, the district court sentenced Mr. Krueger to thirty
years, with thirteen years determinate. Mr. Krueger filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”)
motion requesting leniency, which the district court denied. Mr. Krueger now appeals. On
appeal, Mr. Krueger asserts the district court abused its discretion twice: when it imposed an
excessive sentence and when it denied his Rule 35 motion.

1

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
During a tumultuous time in his life, Dan Krueger was charged with aggravated battery
and burglary, with enhancements for use of a deadly weapon and inflicting great bodily harm
after he stabbed his wife’s boyfriend with a kitchen knife. (R., pp.8-9; PSI p.3.) Pursuant to a
plea agreement, Mr. Krueger pleaded guilty to aggravated battery and use of a deadly weapon.
(Tr., p.5, Ls.22-25, p.10, L.1 – p.11. L.1.) The district court accepted Mr. Krueger’s guilty plea,
set the matter for sentencing, and ordered a presentence investigation report (“PSI”). (Tr., p.11,
Ls.2-10.) In addition, the district court ordered that a mental health assessment be included in his
PSI. (Tr., p.12, Ls.1-19.)
In the mental health assessment, Dr. Davidson explained that Mr. Krueger suffers from
Autism Spectrum Disorder (“ASD”). (PSI, p.169.) “Autism Spectrum Disorder is a
neurodevelopmental disorder that constitutes a serious mental condition.” (PSI, p.169.) The
disorder limits Mr. Krueger’s ability to understand the impact his actions have on other people
and generally interact appropriately with the world around him. (PSI, p.170.) In addition, his
ability to read social and emotional cues and react appropriately to situations is severely
impaired. (PSI, p.171.) His ASD also causes Mr. Krueger to misunderstand people and often be
misunderstood as not displaying the correct response to the circumstances and situation. (PSI,
pp.159, 171.) For example, in eighth grade Mr. Krueger and his classmates got into trouble for
name calling. (PSI, p. 159.) While confronting Mr. Krueger with his misbehavior, the principal
used some of the inappropriate language Mr. Krueger and his classmates had used, and
Mr. Krueger laughed. (PSI, p.159.) The fact that the boys were in trouble did not register to
Mr. Krueger; rather, all he grasped was that the principal cussed. (PSI, p.159.) It was because of
his disorder that Mr. Krueger did not know how to properly act in this situation. (PSI, p.159.)
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These inappropriate reactions continued into his adulthood. (PSI, pp.159-60.) For example, one
time early in Mr. Krueger’s marriage, his wife was extremely upset, and to Mr. Krueger, the
rational and appropriate thing to do was pour water on his wife’s head. (PSI, pp.159-60.) He
thought this was a normal way to diffuse the situation. (PSI, pp.159-60.)
In his professional life, Mr. Krueger has had difficulty with clients because of his
inability to appropriately respond. (PSI, p.160.) He sometimes would debate endlessly with
clients, believing that they were reaching an agreement, when in fact, he was pushing them out
the door. (PSI, p.160.) His mental health evaluation explained that Mr. Krueger’s ASD also
causes him to become fixated and obsessed on certain topics and ideas to the point where he then
believes he reached a conclusion based on reason and logic. (PSI, pp.160; 190.) Mr. Krueger also
has physical habits as a result of his ASD, which are sometimes misunderstood by others. (PSI,
p.159-60.) According to his mental health evaluation, Mr. Krueger is a very regimented and
linear person due to his ASD, and when new challenges or unexpected events arise, Mr. Krueger
mentally shuts down, unable to process how to react. (PSI, pp.160-61.) While there were
suggestions made earlier in his life that he may have had mental health issues, it was not until the
instant offense that his ASD was truly identified and diagnosed. (PSI, pp.158, 161.) Further,
based on the mental health evaluator’s thorough evaluation of Mr. Krueger, the results of his
Violence Risk Assessment Guide—Revised (VRAG-R) showed that he is a very low risk to
reoffend. (PSI, pp.172-73.)
Despite all this, the State recommended an imposed unified sentence of thirty years, with
twenty years determinate. (Tr., p.20, Ls.13-15.) Mr. Krueger requested a ten-year suspended
sentence. (Tr., p.34, Ls.1-3.) The district court determined that contrary to the low-risk
determination by his mental health evaluator, Mr. Krueger posed a significant risk to reoffend
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due to the open nature of his marriage (Tr., p.43, L.25 – p.44, L.8) and sentenced Mr. Krueger to
thirty years, with thirteen years determinate. (Tr., p.46, Ls.8-10.) Specifically, the district court
sentenced Mr. Krueger to fifteen years, with thirteen years determinate for aggravated battery
(Tr., p.46, Ls.1-4), and it enhanced the sentence by fifteen years indeterminate for use of a
deadly weapon. (Tr., p.46, Ls.4-7.) Mr. Krueger filed a Rule 35 motion (Aug., pp.1-2)1, which
the district court denied. (Aug., pp.32-36.) Mr. Krueger timely appealed from his judgment of
conviction and denial of his Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.77-79, 81-83; Aug., pp.32-36.)

ISSUE
I.

Whether the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of
thirty years, with thirteen years determinate, upon Mr. Krueger following his guilty plea.

II.

Whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Krueger’s Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 Motion for a Reduction of Sentence in light of the new information
submitted in support of his motion.

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Excessive Sentence Of Thirty Years,
With Thirteen Years Determinate, Upon Mr. Krueger Following His Guilty Plea
Mr. Krueger argues that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of thirty years,
with thirteen years determinate, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing
court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent
review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the

1

A Motion to Augment Record has been filed contemporaneously with this brief along with
Mr. Krueger’s Rule 35 motion, briefing in support of his motion, and district court rulings
relating to the motion.
4

offender, and the protection of the public interest. State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772 (Ct. App.
1982).
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). In determining if an abuse of discretion occurred, appellate
review centers on whether the trial court: “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the
exercise of reason.” State v. Bodenbach, 165 Idaho 577, 591 (2019).
Here, Mr. Krueger’s sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum. See I.C. § 18-908
(fifteen year maximum for aggravated battery); I.C. § 19-2520 (fifteen year maximum for deadly
weapon enhancement). Accordingly, to show the sentence imposed was unreasonable,
Mr. Krueger “must show that [his] sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is excessive under
any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
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Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
In addition, where a defendant’s mental condition is a significant issue the district court
must weigh mental health as a sentencing condition. I.C. § 19-2523; State v. Miller, 151 Idaho
828, 834 (2011). In doing so, the court must consider:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

The extent to which the defendant is mentally ill;
The degree of illness or defect and level of functional impairment;
The prognosis for improvement or rehabilitation;
The availability of treatment and care required
Any risk of danger which the defendant may create for the public, if at large,
or the absence of such risk;
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law at the time of the offense
charged.
I.C. § 19-2523(1); State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 461 (2002).
Mr. Krueger asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of thirty years,
with thirteen years determinate, is excessive. While this offense is not a minor one—in fact
Mr. Krueger described it as “absolutely horrific” (Tr., p.36, Ls.9-10)—Mr. Krueger is not
without hope for rehabilitation and there are several mitigating factors that support the
conclusion that sentencing Mr. Krueger to thirty years, with thirteen years determinate, was
objectively unreasonable and therefore the district court abused its discretion. Mr. Krueger
submits the combination of his limited criminal history, employment and education, community
support, acceptance of responsibility, expression of remorse, and significant mental health issues
warranted a more lenient sentence.
“The absence of a criminal record is a mitigating factor that courts consider.” State v.
Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 836 (2011). “It has long been recognized that ‘[t]he first offender should
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be accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal.” State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670,
673 (Ct. App. 1998) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982)).
Mr. Krueger has been previously convicted of only two misdemeanors offenses, both nonviolent. (PSI, pp.8-10.) Based on this information, the district court recognized that Mr. Krueger
had a very long history of being law-abiding and that his criminal history was “very limited.”
(Tr., p.44, Ls.6–7.) Nonetheless, the district court imposed a unified sentence of thirty years,
with thirteen years determinate. Mr. Krueger’s minor, non-violent criminal history supports a
lesser sentence.
In addition to having a limited criminal history, Mr. Krueger has a good work history and
strives to better himself and his community. Gainful employment and a defendant’s desire to
advance within a company are also mitigating circumstances that a court should consider.
State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594–95 (1982); see also State v. Mitchell, 77 Idaho 115, 118
(1955). Mr. Krueger has a strong work history (PSI, p.16-17), and at the time of the incident,
Mr. Krueger was attending the Harvard Extension Program at the College of Western Idaho
(CWI), studying pre-med and psychology. (PSI, p.15.) Since his incarceration, Mr. Krueger has
begun the leg-work on a non-profit to assist convicted felons with solutions for housing,
employment, and wellness barriers upon release. (PSI, pp.17, 23, 1738.) Mr. Krueger submits
that his positive employment history, desire to continue his education and career, and creation of
a non-profit supports a lesser sentence.
The family support and strong relationships with Mr. Krueger’s family and friends also
stands in favor of mitigation. See State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594–95 (1982) (family
support and good character as mitigation); see State v. Ball, 149 Idaho 658, 663–64 (Ct. App.
2010) (district court considered family and friend support as mitigating circumstance).
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Mr. Krueger has strong relationships with his sister, who is assisting with his new non-profit
(PSI, pp.11-12, 17, 1721, 1754), and his father, who has a job for Mr. Krueger upon his release
and funds to support him. (PSI, p.1752.) Mr. Krueger has also reconnected with a friend, with
whom he started an intimate relationship four months prior to the offense at issue in this appeal.
(PSI, pp.428-29.) These family ties and his new relationship motivate Mr. Krueger to change his
behavior. (PSI, pp.434, 439, 574, 578); see State v. Coffin, 146 Idaho 166, 177 (Ct. App. 2008)
(support system as mitigation). His family support presents strong mitigation that weighs against
the harsh sentence that he received.
While the offense may be severe, Mr. Krueger immediately took responsibility for his
actions, and expressed remorse, stating that he needed to make amends for his actions. (PSI,
pp.23, 36-37; Tr., p.36, Ls.9-15) See State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that some leniency was required, in part, because the defendant expressed “remorse for
conduct”); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982) (reducing defendant’s sentence, in part,
because “the defendant has accepted responsibility for his acts”). When addressing the district
court at sentencing, Mr. Krueger stated, “My actions . . . were absolutely horrific.” (Tr., p.36,
Ls.9-10.) Mr. Krueger recognized that he “can never repair the mental and physical scars that
[he] inflicted.” (Tr., p.42, Ls.2-3.) He acknowledged he cannot “take away the emotional trauma
that [he’s] caused” or the “traumatic event that [his] neighbors had to experience, that this
community had to experience.” (Tr. p.42, Ls.3-6.) Mr. Krueger also apologized, sincerely, for his
actions. (Tr., p.43, Ls.1-3.) Mr. Krueger recognized the impact his actions had on the victims,
and the severity of the crime, and he acknowledged he could never make it right, although he
will forever be devoted to trying to make amends. (PSI, pp.23, 36-37, 439); see State v.
Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988) (acknowledgement of wrongfulness of
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conduct and open expression of contrition for his acts as mitigation), reversed on other grounds,
117 Idaho 295 (1990)); see also State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982) (reducing sentence
for defendant who, inter alia, “expressed regret for what he had done, especially for the effect it
had upon his family and friends”). His remorse, regret, and acceptance of responsibility present
strong mitigation against the harsh sentence he received.
Mr. Krueger also has significant mental health conditions that should be considered in
evaluating the reasonableness of his sentence. Mr. Krueger has been on anti-depressants since
2012 (PSI, p.155), and was diagnosed with major depressive disorder in 2016. (PSI, p.1730.) His
marriage counselor diagnosed him with adjustment disorder with depression and anxiety as well
as marital adjustment with depression and anxiety. (PSI, p.146.) In addition, Mr. Krueger has
suffered from suicidal ideations (PSI, p.19), has received treatment for suicidal ideations (PSI,
pp.148, 153, 156), and suffers from a severe emotional disorder. (PSI, p.169.) Indeed, once
Mr. Krueger placed a gun into his mouth (PSI, p.168), and once he checked himself into the
hospital to protect himself from self-harm. (PSI, pp.147-49.) Additionally, Mr. Krueger received
several traumatic head injuries prior to the instant offense. (PSI, p.43, 157-58.) Furthermore,
Mr. Krueger was recently diagnosed with ASD. (PSI, pp.169, 171.) This disorder was alluded to
in the past, but no one—not even his parents, educators, or counselors—took any steps to follow
up, seek a diagnosis, treatment, or provide any help or intervention for this mental health
condition. (PSI, pp.158-61, 168.) Under the circumstances of this case, Mr. Krueger’s mental
health was important and worthy of significant attention.
Indeed, his mental health assessment concluded Mr. Krueger’s mental health condition
had a significant impact on his functional behavior. (PSI, p.170.) The symptoms of
Mr. Krueger’s mental health condition are “significant and adverse[ly] involved in most aspects
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of his life.” (PSI, p.170.) The mental health evaluation gave specifics as to how ASD impacts
Mr. Krueger by significantly impairing his social, occupational, and other important areas of his
daily functioning. (PSI, p.170.) For example, he is insistent on sameness; he is inflexible on
adherence to routines, or ritualized patterns of verbal or nonverbal behavior; he has continual
deﬁcits in social communication and social interaction; his emotional responses do not
correspond appropriately with situations; he is unable to understand emotional issues; he has a
“lack of empathy or concern for another person’s perspective”; and he is hyper-focused on
certain topics of interest. (PSI, p.171.) These conclusions are significant to Mr. Krueger’s mental
health and present strong mitigation that weigh against the harsh sentence he received.
Further, based on the findings of his mental health evaluation and in light of his mental
health condition, Mr. Krueger was found to present “a low risk of future violence, a low risk of
future serious physical harm and a low risk of imminent violence.” (PSI, pp.13, 172.) He was
also deemed a low risk to reoffend. (PSI, p.172.) His mental health evaluation recommended
treatment, and noted that without treatment, Mr. Krueger would likely function normally so long
as he did not need to perceive social or emotional cues. (PSI, p.171.) However, without
treatment, if Mr. Krueger had to perceive those cues, his inability to perceive them “pose[d]
signiﬁcant problems in confrontational situations where he could seriously misread social and
emotional cues leading to physical altercations started by the antagonist.” (PSI, p.171.) Further,
Mr. Krueger’s mental health evaluation noted that Mr. Krueger was not prone towards anger
(PSI, p.168), and because of his passivity, he may be at risk of victimization in a correctional
setting. (PSI, p.165.) Indeed, Mr. Krueger is extremely passive in his reactions, obsessively
thinking rather than having any outward reaction. (PSI, p.168.) Typically, when Mr. Krueger
gets upset, he “shuts down” rather than have any verbal or physical reaction. (PSI., p.168.)

10

Again, demonstrating that Mr. Krueger’s mental health and low risk to offend present strong
mitigation in favor of a lesser sentence.
As a collective, the mitigating circumstances overwhelmingly support a lesser sentence.
Indeed, Mr. Krueger’s mental health assessment noted there were no aggravating circumstances
found; however, significant mitigating factors existed. (PSI, p.173.) The significant mitigating
factors found were: (1) adverse childhood experiences with parental conflict over his mother’s
religious involvement and physical abuse by his parents; (2) a lack of treatments or interventions
for the deficits associated with Mr. Krueger’s mental health condition; (3) marital conflict
involving physical abuse by his spouse; (4) a history of depression and hospitalization following
suicidal ideation; (5) little insight into his mental condition; 6) the fact that he “maintained a
stable family unit with a long-term marriage”; and (7) contribution to the community by gainful
employment. (PSI, p.173.) Considering all the mitigating factors collectively, Mr. Krueger
contends, his sentence is objectively unreasonable and thus, the district court failed to exercise
reason when it imposed his thirty-year sentence.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Krueger’s Rule 35 Motion For A
Reduction Of Sentence In Light Of the New Information Submitted
Mr. Krueger also asserts the district court abused its discretion because new and
additional information not present at his original sentencing demonstrates that Mr. Krueger’s
sentence is excessive. Idaho Criminal Rule 35 allows for the reduction or modification of a
sentence. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2006). If a sentence is within the statutory
limits, then the request is a plea for leniency and is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. As
noted above, abuse of discretion review centers on whether the trial court: “(1) correctly
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perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion;
(3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it;
and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” Bodenbach, 165 Idaho at 591. “When
presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of
new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule
35 motion.” Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203.
At Mr. Krueger’s sentencing hearing, the district court focused on the severity of the
offense. (Tr., p.43, L.23-p.44, L.2, p.45, Ls.9-14, 20-21.) However, it made its decision without
the benefit of information from Idaho’s sentencing database, which would have shown past
sentences for men with similar demographic information as Mr. Krueger convicted of similar
offenses. (PSI, p.22.) Mr. Krueger submits that the new information provided with his Rule 35
motion demonstrates that his sentence should have been reduced.
In support of his Rule 35 motion, Mr. Krueger submitted three cases with similar
circumstances in which the district court sentenced the defendants to significantly less time than
Mr. Krueger. (Aug., pp.11-31.) Mr. Krueger submits, this information is significant due to the
lack of comparable offender data at the time of sentencing. (See PSI, p.22.) In addition,
Mr. Krueger reiterated his limited criminal history, mental health, remorse and his mental
health’s effect on his emotional expressions, his leadership and work on his non-profit while
incarcerated, and has spent his time while incarcerated learning about his mental health condition
and how to live a law-abiding life with that condition. (Aug., pp.6-8.)
While Mr. Krueger’s offense may have been of a very serious nature, it did not warrant
the sentence imposed. As the memorandum in support of his Rule 35 motion noted, there have
been more serious offenses which have resulted in far shorter sentences. (Aug., pp.8-9.) While “a
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trial court must sentence the individual, not the crime category,” State v. Kohoutek, 101 Idaho
689, 699 (1980), the “comparison of sentences in conjunction with other relevant factors may
serve as a basis for modification of a sentence by the appellate courts.” State v. Fluery, 123 Idaho
9, 13 (Ct. App. 1992); accord State v. Adair, 99 Idaho 703, 709 (1978), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Byers, 102 Idaho 159 (1981).
Indeed, in one case cited by Mr. Krueger, a defendant charged with murder pleaded
guilty to the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter with an enhancement for use of a deadly
weapon and was sentenced to twenty-five years, with only the first eight years determinate.
(Aug., pp.8, 12-14.) The defendant did not have a criminal history, however, when the defendant
got into a heated argument with his father-in-law, the defendant shot the father-in-law, who did
not survive the ride to the hospital. (Aug., pp.8, 12.) In another case, a son stabbed his father
with a pitchfork, intending to kill him. (Aug., pp.8, 18.) The defendant pleaded guilty to battery
with intent to commit a serious felony, and was sentenced to a unified term of fifteen years, with
only the first five years determinate. (Aug., pp.18, 21.) The defendant had no previous felonies
and did not have a recollection of the incident. (Aug., p.19.) Likewise, a defendant who, after
being kicked out of a bar for fighting, stabbed the person he was fighting with, received a more
lenient sentence than Mr. Krueger. (Aug., p.26.) That defendant had a criminal history and gang
affiliations, in addition to problems while in jail awaiting trial and sentencing. (Aug., pp.26-27.)
The defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated battery with the use of a deadly weapon and was
sentenced to ten years, with only the first three years determinate. (Aug., p.28.)
Here, Mr. Krueger, lacking the capacity to appropriately respond to stimuli, became
overwhelmed and lashed out, similar to the defendant who shot his father-in-law. Just as that
defendant had no violent past, neither did Mr. Krueger. The district court in that case recognized
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these factors, and imposed a reasonable sentence of fifteen years. Here, however, the district
court imposed the strictest-possible sentence on Mr. Krueger. Mr. Krueger submits this was
objectively unreasonable.
Similar to the defendant who stabbed his father with a pitchfork, Mr. Krueger had no
previous felonies and no recollection of the incident. The court in that case recognized the
severity of the crime, yet exercised reason in imposing a sentence that addressed the nature of the
crime, character of the offender, and protection of society, sentencing the defendant to fifteen
years, with five years determinate. In contrast, the district court here emphasized only the nature
of the crime and imposed a far harsher sentence. Mr. Krueger submits that objectively viewed,
this resulted in an unreasonably harsh sentence.
Mr. Krueger did not have a violent criminal history like the defendant who stabbed a man
outside a bar. Nor did Mr. Krueger have significant gang affiliations, or a poor record while
incarcerated. Yet, the district court still sentenced Mr. Krueger to a more severe sentence than
the defendant in that case. Mr. Krueger submits this was objectively unreasonable.
As the new information Mr. Krueger provided in support of his Rule 35 motion shows,
there are countless other cases in which a defendant either committed as serious a crime as
Mr. Krueger, or a far more heinous one, and yet received a significantly more lenient sentence
than Mr. Krueger. Mr. Krueger submits, the district court failed to exercise reason by not
reducing his sentence in light of this new information, especially when considered in conjunction
with the mitigating factors explained above, particularly, Mr. Krueger’s mental health.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Krueger respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing. Alternatively, he requests that the order denying his Rule 35 motion be
vacated and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 5th day of October, 2021.

/s/ Emily M. Joyce
EMILY M. JOYCE
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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